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Essays on the Labor Market Effects
of Place-Based Policies
Jesse McCune Gregory
This thesis consists of three chapters, two of which study
the impacts of spatially targeted government subsidies on
individuals’ residential location choices and on local labor
market outcomes. The first chapter studies the effects of
disaster-relief programs on the rebuilding and resettlement
choices of New Orleans homeowners following Hurricane
Katrina. The second chapter studies the incidence and efficiency of round I of the federal urban Empowerment Zone
program, a set of subsidies targeted to businesses operating
in six chronically poor neighborhoods in large U.S. cities
beginning in the early 1990s. The third chapter develops and
estimates a model of college basketball teams’ optimal strategies across game states and uses the model to reassess the
findings of a highly visible study in forensic economics that
interpreted skewness in the distribution of favorites’ winning
margins as evidence of pervasive illegal point shaving.

Chapter 1
The Impact of Rebuilding Grants and Wage
Subsidies on the Resettlement Choices of
Hurricane Katrina Victims
The first chapter studies the effects of disaster-relief
programs on the rebuilding and resettlement choices of New
Orleans homeowners following Hurricane Katrina. As with
other social insurance programs, policymakers designing
disaster relief packages face a trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency. The desire to assist disaster victims must
be weighed against the fear that subsidizing people to live
in dangerous areas will generate moral hazard with regard
to location decisions. The size of the economic distortion
caused by this type of moral hazard depends on the extent
to which individuals’ and households’ location choices are
influenced by financial incentives. If each household is
nearly indifferent between many different residence locations, then disaster policies that subsidize residence in a
particular location will generate large distortions. If most
households strictly prefer one location, then it is possible for
disaster relief programs to increase the welfare of residents
in disaster-affected areas without generating large distortions. A full appraisal of the impact of disaster-relief policy
on social welfare must consider the direct impact of disaster
relief on victims’ welfare in the aftermath of disasters and the
extent to which the expectation of future postdisaster bailouts
distorts location decisions.
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The largest post–Hurricane Katrina government transfer to Louisiana homeowners occurred through a federally
funded and state-administered grant program known as the
Louisiana Road Home. The Road Home program addressed
two policy objectives. First, the program compensated
homeowners for their losses; it made grant payments both
to homeowners who chose to rebuild and to homeowners
who chose to relocate. Second, the program encouraged
households to rebuild by providing more generous net grant
packages to those who rebuilt than to those who relocated.
Households who agreed to rebuild received a grant equal to
the difference between rebuilding costs and payments from
existing insurance arrangements, while households who
chose to relocate received a less generous net compensation package. The program rolled out slowly, with about
half of the grants dispersed two years or more after Katrina.
However, the program eventually dispersed about $10 billion
in grant payments to Louisiana homeowners, making the
Louisiana Road Home the largest housing recovery program
in U.S. history.
To assess the impact of the Road Home program, I
develop and estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of
New Orleans homeowners’ post–Hurricane Katrina resettlement choices. In the model, households make choices regarding residential locations, home repairs, home sales, and
amounts to borrow or save. The model’s parameters describe
households’ preferences over consumption and residence
locations, and describe households’ ability to borrow. The
model is identified by variation across households in the
financial incentive to rebuild provided by the Louisiana Road
Home program and by variation in the relative labor wages
available in New Orleans versus away from New Orleans for
workers in different occupations. I use the estimated model
to measure the impact of post-Katrina relief programs on
households’ short-term resettlement choices and to quantify
a key component of the deadweight loss associated with a
guarantee of future relief.
In order to estimate the model, I create a unique data set
that combines information from the recently fielded Displaced New Orleans Residents Survey with administrative
records from the Orleans Parish property database. The Displaced New Orleans Residents Survey (RAND 2010) interviewed a representative sample of pre-Katrina New Orleans
residents about four years after Katrina regardless of the
respondents’ locations at the time of the interview. The interviews collected information about respondents’ demographic
background traits, storm-related home damage, insurance
coverage, and migration choices. The administrative property
records contribute data describing any post-Katrina home
sales and a sequence of annual property appraisals that I use
to construct measures of the timing of home repairs.
In addition to yielding substantive results, the paper
makes several methodological contributions. The estimated
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model is the first dynamic structural model of migration to
formally include asset accumulation choices and the possibility of borrowing constraints, an important extension to
recent structural migration models in the literature (see, for
example, Kennan and Walker [2011]). Borrowing constraints
will affect the migration choices of any population that faces
large up-front costs to moving. In the disaster context, those
costs reflect the price of home repairs. The model would
be equally well-suited to investigate migration choices, for
example, among homeowners with negative mortgage equity,
or other populations that face up-front costs to moving.
This paper also contributes to the structural migration
literature by estimating a dynamic structural migration model
using directly observable sources of variation in locationspecific financial incentives. Other studies in this literature
have relied heavily on variation in the individual-location
match component of workers’ wages, which must be inferred
statistically from panel wage data, to identify the influence
of earnings opportunities on migration. Because I replicate
several key findings of the existing literature using a different and more transparent source of identification, my study
provides an out-of-sample validation for the main conclusions of the existing literature.
The estimated model finds that households in this population have a strong preference for living in New Orleans on
average, and large population subgroups face borrowing
constraints. Simulations using the estimated model find that
the Louisiana Road Home program increased the fraction of
homes rebuilt during the first four years following Katrina by
11 percent. This impact occurred primarily by relaxing borrowing constraints for households that would have strongly
preferred to rebuild even in the absence of the subsidy if the
associated costs could have been smoothed. The strength
of households’ location attachments and the prevalence of
financing frictions suggest that effectively administered
disaster relief programs have the potential to substantially
increase social welfare.
Further, the model finds that the deadweight loss associated with disaster-related location subsidies is smaller than
one might anticipate. This result is driven by the estimated
model’s finding that there is substantial heterogeneity in
the strength of preferences for living in New Orleans. Most
households are far from the margin with respect to their
preferred location, and as a consequence, a location subsidy
induces only a small number of households to change their
location choices. Simulations find that a guarantee of relief
in the event of a future disaster generates a deadweight loss
that is at most 3 percent of the policy’s expected cost. This
finding suggests that the efficiency loss from disaster-related
subsidies is substantially smaller than would be predicted
by a model in which agents share homogeneous location
preferences.
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Chapter 2
The Incidence and Efficiency of a Prominent
Place-Based Policy
The second chapter, written jointly with Matias Busso and
Patrick Kline, studies the incidence and efficiency of round I
of the federal urban Empowerment Zone program (EZ). The
EZ program is one of the largest programs in a growing class
of policies that targets transfers toward particular geographic
areas rather than groups of individuals.
Round I EZ designation was awarded to areas in Atlanta,
Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia.
Prior to designation, each EZ was characterized by chronically high rates of poverty and local unemployment. Beginning in 1994, firms operating in EZs became eligible for a
credit of up to 20 percent of the first $15,000 in wages earned
in that year by each employee who lived and worked in the
EZ. These tax credits were available to a business for as long
as 10 years, with the maximum annual credit per employee
declining over time. For reference, the average EZ worker
only earned about $16,000 in wage and salary income in
1990, so this subsidy comprised a substantial portion of the
wages of local workers. Each EZ also became eligible for
$100 million in Social Services Block Grant funds, which
could be used for such purposes as business assistance,
infrastructure investment, physical development, training
programs, youth services, promotion of home ownership, and
emergency housing assistance.
Economists have traditionally expressed little support for
spatial subsidies of this sort, fearing that they will generate large distortions in economic behavior. Indeed, standard
models of spatial equilibrium suggest mobile workers and
firms will arbitrage the benefits associated with local policies
by relocating across the boundaries of targeted areas. Local
land prices ought then to rise and offset any welfare gains
that might otherwise accrue to prior residents.
Our evaluation of the EZ program critically examines
this conjecture. We first develop a tractable spatial equilibrium model of EZs with landlords, firms, and mobile
workers who make labor supply and commuting decisions.
The incidence and efficiency of local subsidies are shown to
depend critically upon the distribution of agents’ preferences
over residential and commuting options. If most agents are
inframarginal in their commuting and residential decisions,
deadweight loss will be small and local workers will reap the
benefits of place-based interventions. If, on the other hand,
agents have nearly identical preferences, as in the classic
models of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), deadweight
loss will be substantial and government expenditures will be
capitalized into land rents. Using arguments similar to Chetty
(2009), we show that our model allows for simple approximations to the incidence and deadweight loss of EZs via a
set of reduced-form elasticities quantifying the program’s
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impact on the wages of local zone workers and commuters,
the rental rate of zone housing, and the number of zone jobs
for local residents and commuters.
Our empirical work centers on estimating these impacts
using confidential microdata from the decennial census and
the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). These data provide us with two independent sources of information on local
employment and allow us to adjust for changes over time in
the composition of workers and firms. Crucial to our analysis, the Journey to Work component of the census microdata
allows us to separate the impacts of EZ designation on zone
workers and zone residents. Because EZs usually constitute
a small fraction of a city’s area, zone residents who work
typically do so outside of the zone. Likewise, most zone
workers are commuters who live outside the zone. Empowerment Zones subsidize the employment of workers who live
and work in the zone, and involve block grants, which may
indirectly subsidize commuters. This makes it critical for us
to be able to distinguish between these populations across the
period of our study—an infeasible task given publicly available data sources.
To identify the causal impacts of EZ designation, we
construct a set of control zones based upon previously
confidential data obtained from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development on the census tract composition of
rejected and later round EZs. Since these tracts were nominated for designation by their local governments, they are
likely to share unobserved traits and trends in common with
first-round EZs, which also underwent a local nomination
phase. We demonstrate that, after some basic adjustments,
the pretreatment levels and trends in these controls closely
mirror those of the EZs. Having demonstrated suitable balance, we assess causal impacts of the EZ program using an
adjusted difference-in-differences estimator.
Our analysis finds that EZ designation resulted in substantial increases in zone employment, along with increases in the
wages of zone residents working in the zone. These changes
in the zone labor market appear not to have been accompanied by dramatic changes in the local cost of living. Population and housing rents remained roughly constant (though
evidence on the rental rates of new arrivals to the neighborhood suggests that rents may eventually rise). These results
suggest that in this context, location and commuting preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous within the local population that EZs’ spatial subsidies accrued to a large extent to
local workers with a comparatively small efficiency cost.

Chapter 3
Do Basketball Scoring Patterns Reflect
Widespread Illegal Point Shaving?
The third chapter develops and estimates a model of
college basketball teams’ optimal strategies across game
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states and uses the model to reassess conclusions of previous
research (Wolfers 2006) that characterizes right-skewness in
the distribution of favorites’ winning margins as evidence of
pervasive illegal point shaving. Wolfers (2006) applies a test
for point shaving that is based on a noneconomic statistical
model of the pattern of winning margins one should expect
under the no-point-shaving null hypothesis. The model
developed in this chapter provides a more formal benchmark
of the patterns that should occur under the no-point-shaving
null hypothesis with the goal of making more accurate inference about the true prevalence of point shaving.
Measuring corruption is an inherently difficult task
because law-breakers cover their tracks. For that reason,
empirical studies in forensic economics typically develop
indirect tests for the presence of corruption. These tests look
for behavior that is a rational response to incentives that only
those who engage in the particular corrupt behavior face.
The validity of these indirect tests depends critically on the
assumption that similar patterns do not occur if agents only
respond to the incentives generated by the institutions that
govern noncorrupt behavior.
Wolfers (2006) considers the prevalence of illegal gambling–related point shaving in college basketball games. The
research design adopted by Wolfers begins with the assumption that that the distribution of winning margins is symmetric under the null hypothesis of no point shaving. Point
shaving occurs when a player exerts less than full effort
so that his team will not “cover’’ the point spread (while
presumably still attempting to win outright). Wolfers shows
that point shaving introduces a right skewness in the distribution of winning margins for favored teams, and under the
assumption that winning margins are symmetrically distributed under the null the prevalence of point shaving may be
inferred from the extent of skewness in the empirical winning margin distribution. This skewness-based test for point
shaving finds evidence that the intent to shave points was
present in about 6 percent of games in which the point spread
is above 12. Wolfers’ study garnered significant attention in
the popular media, reflecting public surprise that corruption
might be so pervasive in amateur athletics.
This chapter develops a structural model of basketball
teams’ search for scoring opportunities in order to better
understand the scoring patterns that follow from optimal but
noncorrupt competition. In the model, teams take turns as
the offensive side searching for scoring opportunities. The
offensive side faces a sequence of arriving shot opportunities, which vary stochastically in quality. As in actual NCAA
basketball games, the offensive side has 35 seconds to
attempt a shot before the opponent is automatically awarded
the ball. Like a worker in a job-search model, the searching
team compares each arriving opportunity with the value of
continued search. Because of the fixed horizon, the optimal
strategy within a possession is a declining reservation policy
where initially only the most advantageous opportunities
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are accepted and less advantageous opportunities become
acceptable as time goes by.
The optimal reservation policy depends on the current
relative score and the time remaining in the game. Especially
near the end of the game, a trailing team prefers to hurry by
taking short possessions, and the leading team prefers to stall
by taking long possessions. The direction of skewness in
the distribution of winning margins depends on whether the
opportunity cost curve associated with strategic adjustments
(measured in foregone expected points per possession) is
steeper when a team adopts a stalling strategy or a hurrying
strategy. The parameters of the search process determine the
opportunity cost of both stalling and hurrying. Skewness
in either direction is possible in principle, so the direction
of any bias in Wolfers’ (2006) test is itself an empirical
question.
I derive and implement a maximum likelihood estimator
of the model’s structural search parameters, and I apply the
estimator to a data set containing point-spread records and
possession-level play-by-play data from the first halves of
5,258 college basketball games played from 2003 to 2008.
The estimated parameters find that in the actual basketball
scoring environment, the marginal cost curve associated with
hurrying is steeper than the marginal cost curve associated
with stalling. This relationship between the slopes of the two
opportunity cost curves suggests that optimal strategies will
cause the distribution of strong favorites’ winning margins
to be right skewed, causing the skewness-based test for point
shaving to overstate the true prevalence of point shaving.
To quantify the magnitude of the skewness that follows
from optimal noncorrupt competition, I use the estimated
model to simulate play during the second halves of games.
I find that optimal noncorrupt strategic adjustments generate skewness patterns that are statistically indistinguishable from the patterns previously attributed to widespread
point shaving. While we know from historical accounts of
point-shaving scandals (Porter 2002; Rosen 2001) that the
true prevalence of point shaving is not zero, I conclude that
point shaving is substantially less prevalent than was thought
based on the skewness-based test.
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